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Introduction 
One of the distinguishing characteristics of the early 21st century is general agreement that the 
planet is heating up and that something should be done about this. Governments around the 
world subscribe to this view, as demonstrated by their explicit acceptance of the key points 
(summaries for policymakers) of a series of reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) and the fact that many have introduced policies designed to limit 
greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time the Stern Review is merely the most prominent 
of a wide range of economic analyses to conclude that measures to bring climate change 
under control can be put in place at an acceptable cost.  
Despite nearly two decades of climate policy, however, greenhouse gas emissions are 
still rising at both global and EU levels. Emissions are continuing to rise in 12 of the 27 EU 
member states, and a significant proportion of the emission reductions that have occurred in 
the EU can be attributed more to economic factors, such as the restructuring that followed the 
end of socialist central planning in central and eastern Europe, than to climate policy1.  
Why this lack of progress?  
The desire is there, the means are available and affordable, so it is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that the principal obstacles to more effective action are political in nature. 
Certainly political obstacles can be readily identified. There is the lingering influence of 
climate sceptics. Governments worry that stringent climate policies will lead companies to 
redirect investment elsewhere. There is the perception that measures which impose costs on 
voters will elicit retaliation at the ballot box. And there is the fact that the actions of 
individual countries, China and the US apart, can make little difference anyway.  
What can be done in these circumstances? 
One option is to identify better political strategies for activist governments, that is, 
strategies that will enable them to take more effective action against climate change without 
incurring significant political damage. We cannot expect democratic governments to 
implement policies that might endanger their prospects of re-election.  
Political scientists have now devoted some attention to this issue, and the international 
investigation that I lead has identified a range of political strategies that are, or could be, used 
by national governments. This article summarises our findings so far.2 
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Unilateral action 
The strategy favoured by climate scientists is to identify the most technically effective and 
economically feasible policies and then simply go ahead and introduce them. This is fine 
when all other relevant political actors agree, or when proposed changes are relatively small, 
but when politically significant actors oppose the climate policies concerned, which is often 
the case for policies that would significantly reduce emissions, unilateral action can incur 
costs such as loss of political support and withdrawal of private investment. This approach is 
therefore not viable as a general strategy, although it may be worthwhile in some 
circumstances. 
Persuasion 
One obvious response by governments to political opposition is to try to convince opponents 
that the policies concerned are indeed the right policies. There are a number of tactics that are 
relevant here. 
For policy preferences to change, actors must believe that the information they are 
given is accurate. For this reason the acquisition and transmission of accurate information is a 
key strategy. When not used cynically, reports and targets can therefore play an important 
role in demonstrating to key actors both the nature and scale of the problem, and exactly what 
needs to be done. In this connection one particularly useful move might be more systematic 
envisioning of what a low carbon society would look like both to inform the design of policy 
instruments and to provide more concrete long-term goals for inclusion in messages about 
climate change and climate policy. The credibility and legitimacy of climate policies could 
also be improved by developing and disseminating more accurate and transparent methods 
for measuring and reporting emissions. 
It is important to ensure that messages are simple and clear. For this reason 
dissemination efforts should focus on just a few selected indicators of current and future 
climate change impacts along with a small number of projected solutions and ensure that 
reports on these are easy to understand. Metaphors and analogies should be used where these 
aid understanding. Messages needed to be repeated often enough to become well-known but 
reformulated periodically so that excessive familiarity does not dull their impact. One 
particularly important aspect of this strategy is to maximise the visibility and transparency of 
climate policy initiatives that governments feel could be made popular, such as subsidies for 
small-scale renewable energy generation. 
Every message about climate change should reinforce the fact that the scientific 
community agrees that global warming is happening and that it is the result of human 
activity. Messages should stress that the debate is over and point out that the detailed climate 
models developed by scientists have helped them correctly predict climate change trends and 
impacts. Messages should also point out that ordinary people are becoming more concerned, 
as opinion polls indicate that citizens are more likely to be concerned if they are aware that 
others are too. 
Different audiences are (potentially) concerned about different aspects of climate 
change, so it is vital that messages are tailored accordingly. Stressing the health impacts of 
climate change is appropriate for general audiences, for example, whereas for business 
audiences a focus on economic impacts should be preferred. It is also important to stress 
regional and local impacts and to tailor messages to different geographical audiences so as to 
µEULQJWKHLVVXHKRPH¶, as problems that are immediate and proximate to people tend to elicit 
more concern. In putting across these messages it is important to use spokespeople who have 
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credibility in the eyes of particular audiences, such as business leaders for business 
audiences. 
As climate policies affect different groups in different ways in addition to any effects 
they may have on climate change, it is important to identify and stress any impacts they may 
have that can be argued to be beneficial to the audience at hand: co-benefits. For business 
audiences it is vital to stress any business opportunities that climate policies open up, and 
indeed to select policies partly on this basis. Economists and forward-looking businesspeople 
may be persuaded that policies designed to encourage investment in new energy 
technologies, such as photovoltaic cells, will in due course enable the country to benefit from 
a first mover advantage. For security-conscious audiences the same policies can be presented 
as measures that improve energy security by reducing the need for oil and/or gas imports. 
And it can be pointed out that measures to encourage switches in travel behaviour from 
private cars to public transport can ease traffic congestion as well as reduce carbon dioxide 
emissions. 
There is also reason to believe that it is important to appeal to a wide range of 
rationalities. The idea here is that market instruments appeal to just one type of human 
rationality, namely that of an economic actor who responds only in a self-interested way to 
price signals, whereas in fact there is considerable evidence that individuals and organisations 
use other rationalities as well. Egalitarians, for example, want greater equity between humans 
and between humanity and nature, while hierarchicalists want better governance and planning 
to ensure that the natural world and its resources are better managed. This suggests that 
messages should be formulated to appeal to each of these different rationalities and that a 
combination of policy instruments needs to be put in place in order to secure wide support. 
It is important to be positive. Messages about climate change often engender feelings of 
demoralisation and helplessness due to the mismatches between the scale and causes of the 
problem and the capabilities of individuals and local communities to act effectively.  It is 
therefore essential to blend negative messages, which are needed to raise concern, with 
positive messages that explain how individuals and communities can make a difference. One 
such message should be that we do not have to wait for some future technology to save us but 
can begin to implement existing solutions today. Technologies to increase energy efficiency, 
for example, can often be quickly deployed at relatively low cost. Conversely it is vital to 
stress the cost of doing nothing by means such as pointing to the costs that have already been 
incurred as a result of floods, hurricanes and the like, as well as highlighting economic 
analyses that indicate that these costs will grow in the future if nothing is done. 
As moral and ethical concerns can inspire citizens to accept policies that require 
personal sacrifices because they believe that important ethical issues are at stake, it is worth 
stressing the disproportionate effects that climate change is likely to have on poorer sections 
of society (nationally and globally) and on people who have not benefited from the ready 
availability of cheap energy the generation of which has been responsible for a large 
proportion of the accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere. This line of thought also suggests 
that climate policies which are seen to distribute costs equitably may encounter less political 
opposition than policies which are perceived as being unfair. 
Another important strategy is to use insights from theories of communications such as 
frame analysis and discourse theory to construct new and more potent storylines. In this 
connection it is instructive to look at the so-called securitisation of climate change. Energy 
security has already been mentioned as a co-benefit of certain types of climate policy, but 
framing climate change as a threat to security in a broader sense, on the basis that it will 
inevitably exacerbate political tensions, directs attention to concepts such as threat, danger, 
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enemy, attack and defend and prioritises the concerns, strategies and norms of national 
defence and intelligence communities. The point is that this type of framing should attract the 
interest and support of new and powerful political actors. The security frame also enables the 
use of powerful metaphors, such as the Manhattan Project, to describe the efforts required to 
bring climate change under control. And constructing climate change as a threat to the 
stability of the nation-state can be FRQVWUXHG DV D µPRYH WKDW WDNHV SROLWLFV EH\RQG WKH
established rules of the game and frames the issue as either a special kind of politics or above 
politics ... something [that] overflows the normal political logic of weighing issues against 
HDFK RWKHU¶3 Perhaps even more promising, at least in the American context, is the recent 
effort to liken the required action on climate change to the Apollo programme of the 1960s 
that put a man on the moon, as this reframes the issue into one that foregrounds the economic 
and social opportunities inherent in the construction of a green economy. This emphasis on 
industrial transformation and economic opportunity is something that even climate sceptics 
can support. While these particular strategies are more applicable to the US than elsewhere, 
they demonstrate the potential in other countries too for devising frames and storylines that 
are better attuned to national specificities and contemporary concerns than those currently in 
circulation. One recent example of this was the attempt to turn the economic crisis of 2008 to 
advantage by portraying spending on efforts to control climate change as a Green New Deal. 
More such innovations will be needed in the years ahead. 
Finally, delivering carefully crafted messages is not the only means by which activist 
governments can try to alter the policy preferences of others. Another possibility is to create 
conditions which lead other actors to change their preferences as a consequence of learning 
for themselves. Perhaps the most prominent contemporary example of such a strategy is the 
transitions management approach. This is based on the idea that new socio-technical regimes 
emerge through successful application and learning LQ µSURWHFWHG VSDFHV¶ LQ ZKLFK QHZ
technologies and social practices are not exposed to the full selective pressures operating in 
the incumbent regime. Applying this approach to climate policy would involve beginning by 
setting a low carbon goal such as a national or sector emissions reduction target. A series of 
multi-SDUWLFLSDQWµWUDQVLWLRQDUHQDV¶ZRXOGWKHQEHFRQYHQHGWRLGHQWLI\WKRVHUHJLPHVZKHUH
emissions are most significant or the potential for change is greatest. Each transition arena 
would then go through an iterative process of (1) understanding the carbon reduction 
FKDOOHQJHIRUWKHH[LVWLQJUHJLPHDQGLGHQWLI\LQJµWUDQVLWLRQJRDOV¶VXFKDVPDNLQJHOHFWULFLW\
supply more sustainable; (2) developing a consensus about alternatives and a basket of 
µYLVLRQV¶ WKDW DUH FRPSDWLEOH ZLWK WKH WUDQVLWLRQ JRDOV  LGHQWLI\LQJ µSDWKZD\V¶ WRZDUGV
those visions, such as expansion of particular types of renewable energy;  (4) instigating 
niche experiments that contribute to the realization of these pathways; and (5) establishing 
processes for social learning and reflexivity across all of these activities. The idea is that over 
time this would lead to a gradual transfer of institutional support away from the existing 
regime towards a low carbon regime and the public policies that realizing this would require4. 
Damage limitation 
%XWVXSSRVHSHUVXDVLRQGRHVQ¶WZRUN,WLVQRWHDV\WRFKDQJHSHRSOH¶s preferences.  
One possible response is for governments to go ahead anyway but employ tactics 
designed to enable them to avoid institutional veto points and minimise political damage. 
Where opponents are in a position to block climate policies by means such as denying official 
approval, mounting legal challenges or refusing to cooperate with implementation, an 
obvious response is to choose policy instruments that do not require legislation, are secure 
from legal challenge and do not require the cooperation of other actors for implementation. 
Introducing unpopular policies HDUO\ LQ D JRYHUQPHQW¶V WHUP of office may allow time for 
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opposition to subside and for the benefits of controversial policies to become apparent before 
the next election arrives. Targeting economic sectors that are able to pass on at least a 
proportion of their extra costs to consumers, such as the power generation sector, should help 
to minimise both business opposition and the chances that voters will blame the government 
for these higher costs, although this strategy will be undermined to the extent that media 
outlets publicise this connection. A further tactic is to adopt policies that target losses on 
small sections of society, in particular those groups that are least able to exercise threats to 
withdraw investment from the country or inflict political damage via the ballot box. 
Compensating powerful actors for the imposition of more progressive climate policies, even 
when their explicit agreement to these cannot be obtained, may nevertheless weaken their 
resistance to these policies and therefore reduce the political costs that these actors inflict on 
the governments that introduce them. The opposition of business to the imposition of a 
carbon tax, for example, may be blunted if the revenue from such a tax is used to reduce 
HPSOR\HUV¶VRFLDOFRQWULEXWLRQV And moving to have relevant decisions taken at other levels 
of governance, in particular the European level, may enable national governments to deflect 
the blame for unpopular climate policies.  
Finally, public actors can take advantage of events that temporarily reduce opposition 
to strong action on climate change. This is an especially important point. If climate change is 
really under way we can expect increasingly frequent and serious weather-related natural 
disasters. To the extent that these are linked by the media to climate change, and they will be, 
we can expect temporary spikes in public demand for strong climate policies which reduce 
the political costs that such policies would otherwise incur. For this reason we can expect 
windows of opportunity to open on a regular basis for governments that keep fully-prepared 
policy options ready to go. 
Exchange policy concessions for acquiescence 
But these strategies may not work either, or may be considered too risky to try.  
What governments faced with powerful opponents normally do is to offer policy 
concessions in exchange for their acquiescence. The strategic choices to be made by 
governments engaging in political exchange include deciding which actors need to acquiesce 
if unacceptable political damage is to be avoided, and deciding exactly what policy 
concessions they are prepared to make in order to secure that agreement. Different strategic 
choices can lead to different policy decisions by leading public actors to make different types 
of policy concessions. Different alliances, for example, may permit the achievement of 
different policy goals. 
There are also some more specific tactics that can be employed. One of the most 
obvious is to offer access to policy making, such as seats on advisory committees, as a 
substitute for policy concessions. Another is to put together package deals whereby 
opponents of particular climate policies are offered concessions in other policy areas, such as 
tax cuts, instead of amendments to the climate policies in question. A third is to negotiate 
agreements whereby industry groups agree to reduce their emissions in exchange for the non-
imposition or delay of legal requirements. Arguably one of the most effective tactics is to 
negotiate cross-party agreements on climate policy, as such agreements both reduce the 
possibility that a change of government would lead to the relevant measures being repealed 
and weaken the incentive for opponents of the policies concerned to shift their support to 
other parties.  
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Alter the terms of exchange 
The problem with exchanging policy concessions for acquiescence, of course, is that it 
weakens climate policies. But if unilateral action leads to political damage, and persuasion is 
often ineffective, what can governments and actors within governments do?  
At least part of the answer is for governments to take steps to alter the terms of 
exchange between themselves and other political actors. To be more precise, governments 
need to reduce their dependence on other actors and increase the dependence of other actors 
on them. To the extent that this is achieved, the stronger bargaining position for governments 
that results should enable them to obtain the acquiescence of other actors to stronger climate 
policies at a lower cost in terms of policy concessions than would otherwise be the case. 
What this means is that altering the terms of exchange should enable governments to 
introduce stronger climate policies without eliciting retaliation and political damage.  
One way of shifting the terms of exchange would be to strengthen the legal powers of 
government in certain ways. For a start, this can enable them to introduce climate policies 
that they would not previously have been authorised to introduce. In addition, extending the 
remit of climate ministers to cover energy, as was done recently in Britain, may remove at 
least one significant potential veto point within officialdom and cabinet as well as extending 
both the range of possible policy amendments that climate ministers can offer to other actors 
in exchange for their acceptance of climate policies and the range of policy decisions on 
which their formal approval is necessary for policies desired by other actors. Centralizing 
planning powers enables national governments to override objections from local authorities 
and others to energy infrastructure projects, such as nuclear power stations, as well as 
extending their ability to approve or block infrastructure projects desired by others. Veto 
points in climate policy decision making may be removed by altering formal decision making 
procedures by means such as reducing the power of upper chambers of legislatures and 
passing framework legislation that enables a greater range of climate policies to be 
introduced by regulation rather than legislation. Governments could bypass limitations on 
their own legal authority, and thereby in effect extend it, by moving to have relevant 
decisions taken at levels of governance at which public actors have the relevant powers, such 
as the European level. Vulnerability to legal challenge could be reduced by strengthening or 
clarifying national law and/or by transferring relevant decisions to jurisdictions in which the 
policies concerned have a sound legal basis, again such as the European level. And 
governments could increase the significance of their control of access to policy making by 
removing any legal rights of access for stakeholders, such as seats on committees, so that 
instead access can be granted or denied at the discretion of the relevant public actor and 
thereby used as a bargaining counter. 
In some circumstances governments can be prevented from introducing new climate 
policies because firms withhold the information they need to assess whether such policies 
would work and how exactly they should be structured. This dependence on others for 
information could be reduced by governments taking steps to obtain information from 
alternative sources, such as foreign governments or foreign companies in the same industry, 
and/or by building up their own in-house capacity by means such as by setting up or 
strengthening dedicated research units. 
In a number of areas governments are dependent on private firms to implement climate 
policies. If the British government is to succeed in decarbonising %ULWDLQ¶VHQHUJ\VXSSO\IRU
example, it needs private companies to build and operate the required types of power stations. 
Governments that enhance their ability to reward or punish these companies are obviously in 
a better position to secure this cooperation. Where companies are legally required to 
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implement policies such as energy efficiency standards, the incentive to cooperate can be 
strengthened by increasing penalties for non-compliance. In other cases strengthening 
financial incentives for cooperation is more appropriate. Cooperation with implementation 
can also be improved by introducing supplementary policies. Energy company investment in 
carbon capture and storage, for example, could be made less risky, and therefore more likely, 
by finalising a long-term stable regulatory framework.  
Where these tactics fail, governments could move to secure alternative means of 
implementing climate policies. New firms, such as foreign multinational companies, might be 
attracted to undertake tasks that others will not touch. Another option would be to strengthen 
the capacity of the state itself to implement public policy by means such as forming state 
agencies to build power stations equipped with carbon capture and storage, or by buying or 
nationalizing one or more major energy firms. 
In addition to efforts to increase political support for climate policies by persuading 
actors and voters to alter their policy preferences, there are at least two ways in which 
governments and actors within governments can try to strengthen political support for more 
radical action. The first is to install more climate policy-friendly politicians and officials in 
key positions in order to reduce the likelihood that incumbents of these positions will 
withhold approval from climate policies. The second is to respond to opposition to key 
climate policies among existing supporters by cultivating other sections of the electorate. 
Whether this can in fact be done is unclear, but the possibility that it might work under 
certain conditions cannot be ruled out altogether. 
One of the most potent political weapons for private firms today is their ability to 
withdraw or withhold investment if climate policies are not to their liking, for example 
because they raise production costs relative to those in other countries. However there are at 
least three ways in which governments can move to improve their bargaining position in such 
situations. First, they can try to compensate for any investment lost by attracting new foreign 
investment. Second, they can strike international agreements that remove the possibility that 
firms can get a better deal elsewhere and thereby reduce or remove the incentive for 
businesses to relocate investment. Global agreement on a carbon tax, for example, would 
remove the possibility of moving to a jurisdiction without a carbon tax. Third, governments 
could impose stricter controls on international capital transactions in order to make it harder 
for firms to shift investment to other countries. Such a move might appear unlikely at a time 
in which free trade and international capital mobility are very much favoured by economic 
and political elites, but it is worth noting that stricter controls could be imposed very swiftly. 
The final point relates to the fact that policy making can be influenced by patronage and 
cash as well as by more legitimate policy and political considerations. For this reason one 
useful tactic for governments would be to add to their own powers of patronage, for example 
by means of creating more posts/honours for distribution to private actors, while restricting 
the use of patronage by others by means such as tightening legal restrictions on the use of 
inducements, such as well-paid seats on company boards, to persuade politicians and officials 
to weaken climate policies. Similarly, governments could reduce the ability of other actors to 
secure policy concessions from elected or appointed officials in exchange for bribes, 
campaign contributions or other financial inducements by tightening legal restrictions on the 
provision and acceptance of such inducements and by stepping up law enforcement efforts. 
The ability of governments themselves to use cash in forms such as subsidies to buy off 
opposition to climate policies, or to secure their implementation, is obviously enhanced to the 
extent that relevant budgets are increased. 
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Other strategies 
It is clear that there are numerous political strategies and tactics available to governments that 
want to take stronger action on climate change. Before we bring this account to an end, 
however, LW LV ZRUWK ORRNLQJ DW WKUHH IXUWKHU VWUDWHJLHV WKDW GRQ¶t fit neatly into any of the 
general categories used so far.  
The first is to delegate at least some decision making on climate policy to non-partisan 
agencies in order to try to depoliticise climate policy, as this should reduce the possibility that 
a change of government would lead to the relevant measures being repealed and thereby 
weaken the incentive for opponents of the policies concerned to shift their support to 
opposition parties. 
Second, governments could alter the organisation of interactions with political actors 
outside government by reforming advisory committees, consultative arrangements and 
lobbying rules. One possibility would be to make it more difficult for business to obtain 
policy concessions behind closed doors by providing seats for independent climate experts on 
all official climate change-related committees on which industry is represented. In some 
circumstances giving new actors access to the policy making process may make them more 
likely to accept proposed policy changes, while in others their exclusion may make action 
more likely by removing any presumption that their agreement is a prerequisite. 
Finally, governments could take greater advantage of the logic of policy spillover 
whereby certain policies, once implemented, exert pressure on governments to continue on 
the same policy path. In relation to climate policy this means, first of all, policies that are 
relatively easy to transfer to other countries, such as measures to encourage renewable 
technologies that can be easily adopted by developing countries. Second, it means policies 
that are particularly difficult to reverse, such as long-term contracts that commit future 
governments to major investment in the restructuring of energy supply. Finally, there are 
climate policies that create functional or political pressure for their own strengthening or for 
the introduction of related measures, such as policies that lead to increased investment and 
employment in the renewables sector. 
And the future 
Climate change, if the IPCC is correct, will cause increasingly severe damage as time goes on 
unless greenhouse gas emissions are brought under control. This article has identified a wide 
range of possible strategies for governments that want to take more effective action against 
climate change without incurring significant political damage. Not all of these are mutually 
compatible, or appropriate for every government, but together they constitute a menu of 
strategic options from which governments can choose. I would like to conclude by listing 
some of the most promising of these. 
First, there are techniques of persuasion: 
x Introducing new frames and storylines; 
x Facilitating learning by means such as transitions management. 
Second, there are damage limitation tactics: 
x Assembling package deals whereby opponents accept climate policies in return for 
compensation in other policy areas; 
x Negotiating cross-party agreements. 
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Certain tactics in political exchanges with other actors can be particularly effective: 
x Distributing costs equitably; 
x Targeting costs on economic sectors that can pass them on; 
x Targeting costs on groups least able to retaliate by inflicting political damage;  
x Compensating powerful actors to weaken their opposition.  
Fourth, governments may move to alter the terms of exchange by: 
x Extending the range of policy areas over which climate ministers have legal authority; 
x Centralising planning powers; 
x Installing more climate-friendly politicians and officials in key positions; 
x Altering decision making procedures to remove veto points; 
x Building up in-house capacity to implement climate policies; 
x Buying or nationalising key firms; 
x Cultivating new sections of the electorate to replace those antagonised by radical 
climate policies. 
And there are three important VWUDWHJLHVWKDWGRQ¶WILWLQWRDQy of these categories:  
x Delegating decision making to non-partisan agencies; 
x Providing seats for independent climate experts on all climate policy-relevant 
committees on which industry is represented; 
x Placing greater emphasis on spillover policies. 
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